
Sisterhood of Struggle

Leadership and Strategy in the Campaign for the Nineteenth Amendment

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Alice Paul's campaign for the Nineteenth Amendment is one of the paradigmatic examples of transformative constitutional reform. From 1913 until the amendment granting women the right to vote was ratified in 1920, Paul rejected the more conciliatory style of lobbying and state-level campaigning practiced by the leaders of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) and instead chose more contentious methods to promote the suffrage cause, including spectacular public demonstrations, hard-fought political campaigns, and courageous wartime picketing.¹ To support the campaign for a new federal amendment, Paul established the Congressional Union in 1913 and the National Woman's Party in 1916, recruiting thousands of like-minded suffragists eager to support her more militant approach. Under Paul's leadership, these suffragists played an essential role in the enfranchisement of more than 26 million women.² Among the ranks of women seeking legal reforms to bolster their political and civic agency, they achieved unparalleled success.

This chapter examines the role of Alice Paul's leadership in securing passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Recent scholarship on popular constitutionalism reminds us that constitutional history encompasses more than the work of litigators and judges; it also addresses movements for social and political reforms, including constitutional amendments.³ To achieve success, reformers must consider opportunities and constraints posed by the broader social and political context, make use of available resources, and devise appropriate tactics. All these strategic choices depend upon effective leaders and organizations. When the twenty-eight-year-old Paul assumed the leadership of the militant suffrage campaign, she sought to establish her place among an older generation of remarkable female reformers and activists: Jane Addams, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Carrie Chapman Catt, Charlotte

Perkins Gilman, Emma Goldman, Florence Kelley, Mary Church Terrell, Lillian Wald, among many others. Historians like Anne Firor Scott have called attention to the “extraordinary efflorescence of female leadership” in this era, and a rich literature in women’s history has examined these leaders’ lives and legacies.⁴ Paul’s work in the militant suffrage campaign is one of the most notable examples of successful leadership in the “age of reform,” and yet her role has never received similarly sustained appraisals.⁵

This chapter focuses, in particular, on two important features of her strategy: her use of a *passionate politics* relying on emotional appeals for recruitment, mobilization, persuasion, and contention; and her commitment to *unruly defiance*, through the party accountability campaigns and wartime acts of civil disobedience. Rather than simply describe these tactics and their results, this chapter instead draws on recent scholarship examining the role of leadership style and organizational form in social movements—what one scholar has called “strategic capacity”—in order to explore *how* these strategies were chosen and implemented, and to assess the strengths and limitations of Paul’s approach.⁶

Passionate Politics

In 1913, when Paul took charge of NAWSA’s Congressional Committee, the U.S. suffrage movement was slowly emerging from a period of “doldrums.”⁷ Many suffragists—especially those impressed by the more militant campaigning introduced by the Pankhursts’ Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) in Britain—began to question NAWSA’s “slow and academic methods.”⁸ Paul was similarly inspired by the tactics introduced by the British suffragettes. She had first encountered the Pankhursts in 1907, during her post-graduate studies in England, and she spent the following two years working as an organizer for the WSPU.⁹ After returning home in 1910, Paul hoped to apply their campaign tactics in the U.S. She would soon discover that thousands of like-minded suffragists were eager to begin a new phase of suffrage campaigning.

Emmeline Pankhurst’s motto—“deeds, not words”—succinctly describes the WSPU’s tactics.¹⁰ Their campaigning was designed less to provoke deliberative debate about the merits of woman suffrage than to inspire support through grand processions and rallies, to irritate through disruptive demonstrations and heckling of political figures, to win sympathy by engaging in hunger strikes in prison, and even to generate fear by engaging in vandalism and other crimes against property.¹¹ They pursued, in short, a passionate pol-

itics. Paul had seen firsthand how these techniques focused the British public's attention, and she was convinced that this style of campaigning could reinvigorate the U.S. suffrage movement.

After successfully pursuing an appointment to become the chair of NAW-SA's Congressional Committee, Paul's first goal was to arrange an enormous parade, to be held in Washington, D.C. on the eve of President-elect Woodrow Wilson's inauguration. Her careful planning revealed her skill in attending to the aesthetic dimensions of persuasion—what one suffragist called “a genius for picturesque publicity.”¹² From her experience working with the Pankhursts, Paul appreciated how emotional appeals, especially when cultivated through dramatic outdoor events, could both develop and consolidate support for her campaign by inspiring suffragists, impressing bystanders, and generating admiring press coverage. In contrast to other suffragists who held parades primarily in order to “sell suffrage” to the public, she was also determined to send a message to the politicians in Washington, especially President Wilson.¹³ A spectacular parade of unprecedented scope could, she believed, offer a demonstration of power.¹⁴

On March 3 more than half a million people gathered along the Pennsylvania Avenue campaign route. A near riot broke out within an hour of its start, marring the ending of a beautiful parade but also producing even more publicity for Paul. Both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* praised its beauty, acknowledged its impressive scope, and rebuked the D.C. police for failing to maintain order.¹⁵ Seeking to take advantage of this spirit of outrage and sympathy, Paul sent out numerous press releases, prepared witness affidavits, and called for action at the highest levels of government. The parade and its aftermath provided the first indication of her talent for responding quickly to events in order to reclaim the tactical advantage. Paul's ultimate goal was for the parade to raise awareness of her call for a federal amendment. Measured by that standard, the suffrage parade, despite its chaotic ending, was a resounding success.¹⁶

Soon after the parade ended, Paul set out to lobby President Wilson and Congress, joining a delegation to speak with the president and organizing a series of delegations, auto parades, and petition ceremonies to draw the attention of Congress. Her continuous barrage of inventive public demonstrations required funding, so she established the Congressional Union to serve as the fund-raising arm of the Congressional Committee. To keep the Union's supporters informed and involved, Paul enlisted the help of journalist Rheta Childe Dorr to publish a new journal called the *Suffragist*. The journal not only offered supporters official “talking points” regarding tactics; it

also helped provide members far from the Washington, D.C., headquarters a sense of identity as part of a vibrant and successful political organization. Paul arranged for professional photographers to attend most of her organizations' suffrage activities, and their images were featured regularly in the journal. The *Suffragist* also included detailed accounts of recent activities—all the meetings, parades, delegations, speaking tours, and pickets—in order to help its far-flung readers feel more intimately familiar with and involved in the work of the organization.¹⁷

Paul's style of passionate politics also produced a vast increase in the amount of newspaper coverage devoted to the federal amendment. To help shape the coverage of the Union's public demonstrations and events, Paul established a professional press office in 1913, with a full-time paid staff member, and sent out a steady stream of press releases to wire services and newspapers across the country. In her memoir Rheta Childe Dorr emphasized the transforming effect of Paul's leadership, observing that suffrage was rarely mentioned in the D.C. press before Paul arrived on the scene. By the end of 1913 it was a topic of coverage on an almost daily basis.¹⁸

It was a remarkable showing for one year's work. The NAWSA leadership, however, was evidently threatened by Paul's success. By early 1914 the Congressional Union separated from NAWSA and became an independent suffrage organization.¹⁹ Paul was also confronted with some rumblings of discontent among suffragists associated with the Union. Several members wrote letters to Paul, protesting the hierarchical structure of the organization and requesting more decision-making authority.²⁰ Paul rejected these complaints and defended her method of organizing. Drawing again from her experience with the WSPU's similarly hierarchical approach, she insisted that the top-down leadership structure was essential for rapid reactions in a fluid political environment.²¹ Transforming the Union into an "immense debating society," she argued, would render the organization useless for its political mission.²² Paul was unmoved by the claim that there was some inconsistency in fighting for democratic equality with an organization structured in such a hierarchical manner.²³

Paul's insistence on this point is noteworthy in light of the rich social science literature examining various organizational models within social reform movements. Sociologist Elisabeth Clemens's study of woman suffrage organizations, for instance, focuses on the state-level organizations during this era and emphasizes their willingness to experiment with innovative organizational structures.²⁴ Paul, however, was convinced that her leadership style was essential for success, and indeed it does not appear to have caused

irreparable harm to her organizations' ability to achieve their strategic goals during the suffrage campaign.

In exploring the prerequisites for the success of social movement leaders—what he calls “strategic capacity”—sociologist Marshall Ganz identifies three concomitant attributes of effective leadership: the ability to motivate others, access to relevant sources of expertise, and collaborative styles of decision making.²⁵ Paul's rejection of more democratic and collaborative organizational structures, however, did not undermine her members' motivation. Nor did her refusal to engage in extensive and robust debates keep Paul from choosing and refining consistently effective strategies and tactics.

Perhaps the reason why her leadership during the suffrage campaign proved to be a successful exception is that she had developed unusually deep “salient knowledge” regarding available targets, tactics, and timing, which rendered less important a more collaborative style of decision making.²⁶ The suffragists who worked so tirelessly to implement Paul's strategies also believed in her abilities and trusted her to develop strategy.²⁷ Paul's success in crafting and implementing strategies further increased her members' motivation and admiration. Maud Younger, a leading suffrage organizer, wrote of Paul: “She is a genius for organization, both in the mass and in the detail.”²⁸ Lucy Burns endorsed this view: “Her great assets . . . are her power to make plans on a national scale; and a supplementary power to see that it is done down to the last postage stamp.”²⁹ Doris Stevens, a leading suffrage campaigner and author of the memoir *Jailed for Freedom* suggested that Paul's record of success itself converted the “timid” members who questioned her strategy, observing that “most of the doubters” eventually “banished their fears” and came “to believe with something akin to superstition that she could never be wrong, so swiftly and surely did they see her policies and her predictions on every point vindicated before their eyes.”³⁰

One of Paul's greatest strengths as a leader was her ability to inspire the suffragists who worked for her. Despite her use of a hierarchical organizational structure, she never felt the need to control the implementation of her strategy by leaving only the more insignificant tasks to her members. Instead, Paul delegated a great deal of responsibility to various colleagues within her organizations—the tasks of writing speeches, preparing press releases, delivering speeches, organizing voters, and lobbying Congress—and she sought every opportunity to remind them of the importance of their jobs. Paul always provided the strategic direction, but her “lieutenants” had ample freedom to develop their talents and each knew that their contributions were essential. Paul never shied away from honoring them for their efforts

and success. Each issue of the *Suffragist* was filled with praise for suffragists assuming leadership roles as organizers, lobbyists, public speakers, and demonstrators. Even decades later, in her interviews with historian Amelia Fry, Paul constantly veered off into lengthy digressions, changing the topic in order to emphasize the important contributions of various suffragists and their roles.³¹

Similarly, throughout the suffrage campaign, Paul shifted the focus away from herself and to her illustrious forebears. She continually sought to strengthen the collective memory of suffragists in the U.S. by invoking, with reverence, the prior generation of leaders who had fought for suffrage and died before it had been won.³² These efforts constituted one of the more distinctive features of Paul's brand of passionate politics. Paul's efforts to honor Susan B. Anthony, especially, were truly sincere. Their shared Quaker heritage, uncompromising devotion to woman suffrage, and willingness to defy government authority in pursuit of that cause likely encouraged Paul to identify personally with Anthony. Even in private, her esteem was obvious. Anthony's former rosewood writing desk was one of Paul's first acquisitions when setting up the new Congressional Committee headquarters in 1913, and she kept that desk for decades, even taking it to her retirement cottage in Connecticut.³³ During the campaign, Paul changed the name of the proposed federal amendment to the "Susan B. Anthony Amendment," marking the occasion with a large pageant in Washington, D.C.³⁴ When campaigning against the Democratic Party in 1914 and 1916, Paul attributed the political strategy to Anthony (rather than the Pankhursts). During the picketing, a number of the suffragists' placards incorporated quotations from Anthony. After the first victory in the House, the *Suffragist* included a story titled "Miss Anthony's Vindication."³⁵ To celebrate the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, Paul organized an elaborate ceremony—on February 15, 1921, the 101st anniversary of Anthony's birth—featuring the installation of a group sculpture of Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Anthony, the first women so honored, in the Statuary Hall of Congress.³⁶ Crystal Eastman later observed that Paul's name, during this carefully orchestrated ceremony, was never even mentioned.³⁷ Just as Paul appreciated the need to share recognition with her colleagues, she also understood the importance of portraying ratification as the vindication of a multigenerational struggle. Her attention to the power of collective memory to inspire and enhance solidarity never wavered in future years. Paul would continue organizing similar events, such as one celebrating the seventy-fifth anniversary of Seneca Falls in July 1923, during which she revealed the final wording of her proposed Equal Rights

Amendment. On this occasion Paul arranged to have a photographer accompany her to Anthony's grave, for an official portrait of Paul kneeling at the gravesite. It is a moving depiction of Paul's wish to pay her respects—and one likely designed to summon Anthony's memory in order to rally others to support the next phase of her work on behalf of the new amendment.³⁸

Unruly Defiance

If Paul was a master at forging bonds of allegiance among her followers, she proved to be just as adept when it came to provoking discomfort, anger, and even fear in her opponents. Her preference for a more contentious style of politics was rooted in her deep appreciation for the Pankhursts' style of campaigning, which relied on both party accountability campaigns and civil disobedience in order to transform the suffrage debate. No longer would suffrage be framed as a request to be granted out of politicians' sympathy or enlightened benevolence. Instead Paul, like the Pankhursts, pursued strategies that would make suffrage a matter directly affecting politicians' self-interest. Paul's pursuit of a strategy of unruly defiance eventually earned her the moniker, "the Pankhurst of the Potomac."³⁹ It also proved to be the most distinctive feature of her campaign's success.

Although today Paul's party accountability campaigns are either forgotten or dismissed as ineffective, they were an essential component of her strategy of unruly defiance. In 1914 and 1916, Paul sent suffrage organizers to the western states where women already held the right to vote, to urge these women to punish Democratic Party candidates for their party's failure to pass a federal suffrage amendment. When introducing her plans for these campaigns, Paul simply presented a fully developed strategy for an up or down vote. No alternatives were offered, and the outcome of these meetings was never in doubt. Paul always took the opportunity to convince as many as possible to support her plans, but those who did not typically resigned their position and left the organization. While most of her supporters accepted her rationale for the 1914 campaign, her plan to create a new organization, the National Woman's Party (NWP), for the 1916 presidential campaign was far more controversial—owing largely to the high stakes of the election for the war question. During his campaign for reelection, Wilson was thought to be the only candidate who would avoid declaring war. For many suffragists, even those who favored Paul's more defiant tactics, their commitment to pacifism clashed with the NWP's plan to punish the Democratic Party. Although the results were mixed—in 1916 Wilson won most of the western

states—Paul’s determination ultimately forced the Democratic Party to fear the consequences of her continued use of the party accountability strategy. Following the 1916 election Vance McCormick, Chairman of the Democratic Party, described the stakes going forward: “Our weakest spot is the suffrage situation,” he concluded. “We must get rid of the suffrage amendment before 1918 if we want to control the next Congress.”⁴⁰ If Paul failed to hold the Democratic Party accountable in 1916, as she intended, she certainly succeeded in placing Wilson and his party on notice.⁴¹

Paul’s rejection of a collaborative approach incorporating diverse perspectives did not undermine this phase of the suffrage campaign. With her sophisticated appreciation of the president’s strategic importance and the dynamics of party competition in this era, she could rely on her own expert judgment regarding the need for the party accountability campaigns.⁴² Paul also avoided the negative impact of disgruntled members by encouraging those who disagreed with her choices to leave her organizations. An important sorting dynamic had developed with NAWSA. Suffragists frustrated with NAWSA’s more conciliatory approach sought out Paul’s leadership and were more likely to find her strategy of unruly defiance appealing. Those suffragists who balked at Paul’s choices of contentious tactics were left to find other more amenable venues to support suffrage or to promote other causes, such as the peace movement in 1916. To be sure, it is not as though Paul disrespected the opinions of her staff and rank-and-file members. Indeed, she expended considerable effort defending her most controversial tactics—both the party accountability campaigns and especially the wartime picketing—to her followers and other potential supporters.

Paul’s persuasive abilities were never more essential than during what has been called the “endgame” of the suffrage campaign, when the National Woman’s Party began picketing the White House during World War I.⁴³ After his reelection Wilson refused to receive any more suffrage delegations. Paul, however, was determined to keep his attention focused on the suffrage issue. Once it appeared that war was imminent, she sought input from the leaders of her suffrage organizations. Paul emphasized how much the suffrage fight mattered in the current climate: “We must do our part to see that war, which concerns women as seriously as men, shall not be entered upon without the consent of women.”⁴⁴ She also reminded them that if they wanted to work on behalf of the peace movement, or to help prepare for the war, there were separate organizations devoted to those causes. The NWP leadership met in Washington and voted to support Paul’s strategy just in time to organize a picket on March 4, the day of Wilson’s second inauguration. Despite the cold

and stormy weather, hundreds of suffragists carrying banners circled the White House, hoping to deliver their message to the president, but Wilson refused to acknowledge them.⁴⁵

Once the U.S. officially entered the war, Paul was determined to continue picketing. In her doctoral dissertation, she had assessed the harm resulting from suffragists' suspension of their campaign for the duration of the Civil War. For this reason, she was extremely wary of NAWSA's war stance, to publicly end lobbying and to mobilize in support of the war.⁴⁶ Even knowing that the Pankhursts had suspended their activities immediately once war was declared in Britain, she was not dissuaded. Paul's decision may have cost her a sizable portion of the NWP's membership.⁴⁷ Some of Paul's senior colleagues, including Harriot Stanton Blatch and Mary Beard, chose to leave the organization at this time.⁴⁸

Although the NWP picketing continued with few disturbances for several weeks, the situation became more adversarial once the picketers began holding banners with quotations from Wilson's speeches, carefully chosen in order to point out the hypocrisy of defending a fight for democracy abroad while ignoring the failure to live up to democratic ideals in the United States. Such confrontational rhetoric caused much distress and alarm throughout the NWP membership. Letters came in from suffragists across the country expressing concern that Paul's tactics would cost the movement much-needed support.⁴⁹ Other suffragists worked to counter the negative press coverage, by passing resolutions of support in their state branches, sending copies of the *Suffragist*, or writing editorials for their local newspapers.

This rhetoric also goaded the government into responding with more heavy-handed tactics. The District of Columbia Chief of Police, Raymond Pullman, notified Paul that further picketing would lead to arrests. She immediately informed the NWP picketers of these developments, so they could decide whether they wished to go on and risk arrest.⁵⁰ The volunteers agreed to forge ahead despite the threat, and over the next few weeks, beginning on June 22, dozens of NWP picketers were arrested. Mobs attacked the picketers when they unfurled banners proclaiming "Kaiser" Wilson's hypocrisy.⁵¹ Then, on July 17, sixteen picketers were sentenced to sixty days at the Occoquan Workhouse in Virginia.

At this stage the NWP picketing commanded front-page news coverage, an impressive feat during wartime that was largely because of the elite social status of the women receiving the long sentences.⁵² As Nancy Cott explains, "The usefulness of suffrage militance was biased toward the elite; the wealthier its proponent was—the more ladylike she was supposed to

be—the greater the effect of her subversion of the norm.”⁵³ Paul had always sought to recruit supporters from the working class, but most of her paid staff and leading advisers were socially prominent, highly-educated, and well-connected women. The suffragists who were arrested and imprisoned during the picketing campaign included daughters of senators and congressmen, wealthy socialites, and wives of prominent journalists and party leaders.⁵⁴ Paul sought to take advantage of the publicity produced by their arrests, even going so far as to ask the most socially prominent of her members to volunteer for duty when there was a need for more publicity.⁵⁵

As the picketing continued the suffragists’ defiance in the face of arrests and longer imprisonments eventually roused public sympathy. The *Boston Journal* observed, “The little band representing the NWP has been abused and bruised by government clerks, soldiers and sailors until its efforts to attract the President’s attention has sunk into the conscience of the whole nation.”⁵⁶ Paul’s decision to endure the initial hostility and continue protesting, despite the risks, proved to be a crucial part of her campaign’s eventual success. The publicity resulting from these longer sentences and reports of dreadful prison conditions appeared to push members of Congress to offer unprecedented demonstrations of support.⁵⁷ On September 15, the day after Senator Andrieus Jones, the Chair of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, visited Occoquan, the suffrage amendment was reported out of the Committee.⁵⁸ The House created a standing committee on suffrage just days later on September 24.⁵⁹

In October Paul herself was arrested while picketing the White House, and she received the most severe sentence of all—seven months at Occoquan.⁶⁰ From her own prison cell, Lucy Burns had been quietly organizing within Occoquan for several weeks to circulate a petition among the imprisoned suffragists. The petition was smuggled out and sent to government officials, but this only resulted in each of the signers being placed in solitary confinement.⁶¹ In protest, Paul launched a hunger strike on November 5.⁶² The publicity generated by the hunger strikes—especially when combined with reports of violence against suffragists sent to jail on November 15—created an untenable situation for Wilson.⁶³ On November 27 and 28 all the suffrage prisoners were released.⁶⁴ A few weeks later, pressured by Wilson’s first public endorsement of a federal amendment, the House passed the Susan B. Anthony Amendment.⁶⁵ Paul continued to rely on the politics of unruly defiance for the remainder of the campaign, introducing a series of new protest tactics during the long fight to win the Senate’s support and the amendment’s ratification.⁶⁶

Victory and Beyond

Paul's preferred style of leadership certainly did not satisfy all the prerequisites for optimal strategic capacity. Her rejection of shared decision-making power marginalized diverse views, even to the extent of driving most dissenters away. Her organizations failed even the most minimal test of democratic legitimacy. Paul, however, made up for those deficits predicted to follow from the rejection of collaborative models of deliberation. She was a student of spectacle and politics. Her prior education, protest experiences, and leadership strengths were uniquely suited to the passionate politics and acts of unruly defiance that she chose to pursue. Her instincts during the final years of the suffrage campaign were almost unerring, informed as they were by years of study and experience. Her pursuit of a strategy of unruly defiance through party accountability campaigns, even if they did not defeat many candidates, caused both Wilson and members of Congress to worry about the damage the suffrage issue might cause to their parties' electoral fortunes. The picketing, prison protests, and hunger strikes may have been unpopular with some of her followers, but Paul's strategy attracted a sufficient number eager to participate and sustain a level of unremitting protest that kept the public riveted. These picketers' determination, even in the face of the government's hostility and lengthy prison sentences, pushed Wilson and other party leaders to confront the suffrage issue, despite their preoccupation with the war.

Paul's style of leadership, in those times and for that cause, worked. Most of her followers admired her more contentious approach and supported her choice of tactics. Because Paul's strategy of unruly defiance operated in tandem with the lobbying of the more conciliatory NAWSA, suffragists of different temperaments and political views could choose which tactics to support, creating a division of labor that served to strengthen the movement. This sorting dynamic left Paul with an uncompromisingly determined band of protestors who could more effectively pursue her preferred strategies. She could act as a "commander" of troops eager to achieve a shared goal: suffrage.

Yet once the fight for suffrage ended, so did the common purpose holding together the various constituents of the NWP. As Harriot Stanton Blatch explained, although "all sorts and conditions of women were united for suffrage, that political end has been gained, and they are not at one in their attitude towards other questions in life."⁶⁷ The post-suffrage context called for different skills to negotiate a new source of conflict: What should women fight for, now that they had the vote? As they sought to form a new substantive agenda, former suffragists confronted sharp disagreements—and rising

stakes. In contrast to the suffrage era, when opposing camps with different strategic philosophies formed a useful division of labor, competing factions now supported irreconcilable goals.

The most prominent of these clashes pitted advocates of equal treatment against those favoring protective labor laws, but there were many additional sources of conflict.⁶⁸ Paul had hoped that a campaign for equality of legal rights might form the basis for unified action going forward, but the discord surrounding the 1921 NWP Convention demonstrated that the era of single-issue campaigns for women's rights had ended. When planning the meeting, Paul thwarted her members' efforts to offer a more diverse agenda, leaving advocates of birth control, the peace movement, protective labor legislation for women, and voting rights enforcement for African American women to search for other venues to advance their causes.⁶⁹ "The old crowd has scattered never to gather in the old way again," one NWP member sadly concluded.⁷⁰

Paul's leadership style was ill-suited to the tasks ahead.⁷¹ The National Woman's Party would transform over time into a far smaller corps of Washington-based lobbyists.⁷² Its legalist agenda—a federal Equal Rights Amendment to guarantee formal equality in the law—failed to arouse grass-roots support. The NWP had become "bogged down in legal formalism," Doris Stevens dourly concluded in 1946.⁷³ What had at one time been a unified sisterhood struggling together to win suffrage had in the decades that followed become a far more fractious sisterhood struggling among themselves, their efficacy greatly diminished by bitter in-fighting, attempted leadership "coups," and a suspicious resentment of fresh ideas or new recruits.

Paul's limited vision, which took equal treatment in the law as *the* feminist goal, was linked to her outmoded belief that an effective strategy must provide one cause around which women as a class could unite. A more radical agenda to address women's subordination would require addressing all sorts of issues—labor rights, racial discrimination, health and welfare support, sexual freedom—which Paul considered either diversions (not truly *women's* issues) or distasteful. For many women, the limits of Paul's strategic vision were all too apparent in the post-suffrage era, yet she never lost faith in her task. She lobbied on behalf of the ERA for the remainder of her life.⁷⁴ As a strategic thinker and leader, she never comprehended that her most powerful traits—her unflagging belief in the righteousness of her cause, her defiance and persistence in the face of opposition—could serve at one time as a source of enormous strength but at other times be her greatest weakness. Strategic capacity requires far more, if it is to endure.

NOTES

1. For a more extensive analysis of Paul's contributions to the suffrage campaign, see Lynda G. Dodd, *Parades, Pickets, and Prison: Alice Paul and the Virtues of Unruly Constitutionalism*, 24 *J. Law & Pol.* 339 (2008).
2. Eleanor Flexner & Ellen Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movement in the United States* 317 (rev. ed. 1975).
3. Dodd, 340–43.
4. Anne Firor Scott, *A New-Model Woman*, 8 *Rev. Am. Hist.* 442, 446 (1980). For a sampling of this work, see Ellen Carol Dubois, *Harriot Stanton Blatch and the Winning of Woman Suffrage* (1997); Candace Falk, *Love, Anarchy, and Emma Goldman* (1984); Marjorie N. Feld, *Lillian Wald: A Biography* (2009); Paula J. Giddings, *Ida: A Sword among Lions: Ida B. Wells and the Campaign Against Lynching* (2008); Louise W. Knight, *Citizen: Jane Addams and the Struggle of Democracy* (2005); Ann J. Lane, *To "Herland" and Beyond: The Life and Work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman* (1990); Kathryn Kish Sklar, *Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work: The Rise of Women's Political Culture, 1830–1900* (1997); Judith Schwarz, *Radical Feminists of Heterodoxy: Greenwich Village, 1912–1940* (1986); Jacqueline Van Voris, *Carrie Chapman Catt: A Public Life* (1987); Beverly Washington Jones, *Quest for Equality: The Life of Mary Eliza Church Terrell, 1863–1954* (Oct. 1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
5. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (1960). For a review of suffrage historiography, see Dodd, 346–53.
6. See, e.g., Marshall Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements*, in *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* 177 (Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper, eds. 2004); Elisabeth S. Clemens, *Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1880–1920*, 98 *Am. J. of Soc.* 755, 757–59 (1993); Elisabeth S. Clemens, *Two Kinds of Stuff: The Current Encounter of Social Movements and Organizations*, in *Social Movements and Organization Theory* 351–65 (Gerald E. Davis et al., eds. 2005).
7. Dodd, 359–64.
8. Rheta Childe Dorr, *A Woman of Fifty* 281 (1924).
9. See Amelia R. Fry, *Conversations with Alice Paul: Woman Suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment*, *Suffragists Oral History Project*, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley 32–34 (1976).
10. Emmeline Pankhurst, *My Own Story* 49 (1914).
11. On the WSPU's campaign, see, e.g., Laura E. Nym Mayhall, *The Militant Suffrage Movement: Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, 1860–1930* (2003); Lisa Tickner, *The Spectacle of Women: Imagery of the Suffrage Campaign, 1907–1914* (1988).
12. Inez Haynes Irwin, *The Story of the Woman's Party* 100 (1921).
13. Dubois, 149–55; Margaret Finnegan, *Selling Suffrage: Consumer Culture & Votes for Women* 45–75 (1999); Katharine H. Adams & Michael L. Keene, *Alice Paul & the American Suffrage Campaign* xvi, 42–75 (2008).
14. Jean H. Baker, *Sisters: The Lives of America's Suffragists* 191 (2005); Linda J. Lumsden, *Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly* 77 (1997); Michael McGerr, *Political Style and Women's Power, 1839–1930*, 77 *J. Am. Hist.* 864, 877–78 (1990).

15. *Parade Protest Arouses Ire in the Senate*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1913, at 8; *Woman's Beauty, Grace, and Art Bewilder the Capital*, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1913, at 3; *100 Are in Hospital*, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1913, at 10.
16. Dodd, 364–72.
17. See Photographs from the Records of the National Woman's Party, available at <http://rs6.loc.gov/ammem/collections/suffrage/nwp/> (accessed Dec. 8, 2009).
18. Dorr, 287–88.
19. On the break with NAWSA, see Dodd, 377–79.
20. For the most thorough coverage of this dispute, see Loretta Ellen Zimmerman, *Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1912–1920, at 92–99* (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University).
21. Social movement scholar William Gamson uses the term “combat readiness” to describe this trait of hierarchical reform organizations. William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, ch. 7 (2d ed. 1990).
22. Letter from Alice Paul to Eunice R. Oberly (Mar. 6, 1914), *microformed on NWP Papers*, Reel 1; Christine A. Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910–1928*, 51 (2000); see also Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890–1920*, 5 (1965).
23. See also Dodd, 381–82.
24. Clemens, 762 (examining California, Wisconsin, and Washington).
25. Ganz, 178–91.
26. *Id.* at 185.
27. Doris Stevens, *Jailed for Freedom* 16 (1920).
28. Irwin, 15.
29. *Id.* at 16.
30. Stevens, 15–16.
31. See, e.g., Paul Interview, 83–84, 356–57.
32. On the role of collective memory in culture and politics, see, e.g., Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory* (1994); Francesca Polletta & James M. Jasper, *Collective Identity and Social Movements* 27 *Ann. Rev. Sociol.* 283 (2001); see also Reva Siegel, *She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family*, 115 *Harv. L. Rev.* 947 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, *Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning about the “Woman Question” in Sex Discrimination Discourse*, in *History, Memory, and the Law* 131 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds. 2002).
33. Paul Interview, 65–66.
34. *Id.* at 113.
35. *Suffragist*, Jan. 19, 1918, at 8.
36. Paul Interview, 351–54.
37. Crystal Eastman, *Alice Paul's Convention*, in *Crystal Eastman: On Women and Revolution* 59–60 (Blanche Wiesen Cook, ed. 1978).
38. See Anita Pollitzer and Alice Paul at Susan B. Anthony gravesite, July 1923, Photographs from the Records of the National Woman's Party, *supra*. On Harriot Stanton Blatch's indignant objections to Paul's focus on Anthony's importance and the consequent diminishing role of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, see Dubois, 246–50.

39. Caroline Katzenstein, *Alice Paul, the Pankhurst of the Potomac: Her Personality and Characteristics*, Phil. Record, Nov. 4, 1917 (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Alice Paul Papers, Box 17, Folder 252).
40. Irwin, 180.
41. Dodd 416 n. 354; 418 n. 362; 420 n. 373.
42. *Id.* at 373–74, 385.
43. Baker, 183–230; *see also* Dodd, 396–416.
44. *See* Letter from Alice Paul to State Chairmen, Feb. 8, 1917 (Paul Papers, Box 17, Folder 252).
45. *Suffragists Girdle White House in Rain*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1917, at 3; *Rain Soaked, 500 Suffragists Parade Four Times around White House as 5,000 Cheer*, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1917, at 1; *President Asked to Open Second Term with Action on Suffrage, Refuses to See Delegation which Waits Two Hours in Rain*, Suffragist, Mar. 10, 1917, at 7–9.
46. *Cf. Pickets Delay Legislation, Mrs. Catt Tells Miss Paul*, Wash. Post, May 26, 1917, at 2; *Suffrage "Pickets" Remain on Guard, Miss Paul Says Party Will Not Heed Mrs. Catt's Protest*, Wash. Post, May 27, 1917, at 12.
47. The NWP may have lost up to one-sixth of its membership during the war. *See* Adams & Keene, 172.
48. Paul Interview, 93, 212, 214, 338–39; Nancy F. Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* 303 n. 11 (1987).
49. *See, e.g.,* Letters from July and August 1917, *microformed* on NWP Papers, Reels 45–47. Although the NWP initially lost some support, this rhetorical strategy succeeded in keeping the suffrage cause at the center of public debate. *See* Letter from Katharine R. Fisher to Lucy Burns (July 14, 1917), *microformed* on NWP Papers, Reel 45 (“It is better to make people mad than not to have them know you are around. . . . What a pity we cannot have a perfectly ladylike organization to raise funds and another to raise hell!”).
50. Paul Interview, 216, 219–20.
51. *See* Photograph of Virginia Arnold (holding Kaiser Wilson Banner), Records of the National Woman's Party. *See* *Rioters Storm Women Pickets' Headquarters*, Chi. Daily Trib., Aug. 15, 1917, at 1; *Washington Crowd Eggs Suffragettes*, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1917, at 3; *All-Day Suffrage Riots*, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1917, at 22; *Anti-Picketers Attack Women and Ex-Envoy*, Chic. Daily Trib., Aug. 17, 1917, at 3; *Suffrage Banners Seized by Throng*, Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1917, at 7; *President Onlooker at Mob Attack on Suffragists*, Suffragist, Aug. 18, 1917, at 7.
52. *Sixteen Militants Begin 60-Day Term*, Wash. Post, July 18, 1917, at 1; *see also* Kraditor, 207 n.32.
53. Cott, 55; *see also* Paul Interview, 222.
54. For more information about the suffrage prisoners, *see* Linda G. Ford, *Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912–1920, 197–223* (1991); Stevens, 354–371.
55. Louisine Waldron Havemeyer, *The Prison Special: Memories of a Militant*, 71 Scribner's 661–64, 672–73 (June 1922).
56. *Comments of the Press*, Suffragist, Sept. 1, 1917, at 11 (quoting Boston Journal, Aug. 18, 1917); Ford, 169. While the picketing continued, Paul characteristically sought to capitalize on the controversy, sending six of the NWP's most experienced organizers on a speaking tour “to every large city in every State in the Union.” *The National Woman's Party Goes before the People*, Suffragist, Sept. 29, 1917, at 8.

57. *Pickets Bring Charges, Accuse Whittaker of Cruelty to Occoquan Prisoners*, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1917, at 5; *Asks Occoquan Probe, Board of Charities Acts upon Charges by the Woman's Party*, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1917, at 1.
58. Flexner, 279; Irwin, 305–6.
59. 55 Cong. Rec. 7369–85 (1917); *House Aids Suffrage*, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1917, at 2; *House Moves for Suffrage*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1917, at 11.
60. *Pickets in "Solitary,"* Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1917, at 14; *Alice Paul Sentenced*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1917, at 12.
61. *Pickets to Be Punished*, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1917, at 5.
62. *Miss Alice Paul on Hunger Strike*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1917, at 13; *Miss Paul, Picket, Declines to Feast*, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1917, at 7; *Force Yard of Jail to Cheer Miss Paul*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1917, at 8.
63. The NWP referred to this event as "The Night of Terror." *Accuse Jailors of Suffragists*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1917, at 1; *Mrs. Brannan Tells of Treatment*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1917, at 11; *The Night of Terror*, Suffragist, Dec. 1, 1917, at 7; *A Week of the Women's Revolution*, Suffragist, Nov. 24, 1917, at 4. See also Lumsden, 134.
64. *Move Militants from Workhouse, Confinement There Illegal, Judge Waddill Holds*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1917, at 6; *Suffrage Pickets Freed from Prison*, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1917, at 13; *Jail is Calm and Peaceful Again, as 22 Suffragettes are Released*, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1917, at 2; *Judge Releases 8 More Pickets*, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1917, at 5. On November 23 Judge Edmund Waddill had ruled that the suffragists had been illegally imprisoned at Occoquan (rather than the District Jail) and that they could be paroled on bail or finish their terms at the District Jail. Twenty-two women chose to finish their terms at the jail, and they were released on November 27 and 28. On March 4, 1918, the D.C. Court of Appeals invalidated all of the picketers' convictions and original arrests. *Hunter v. District of Columbia*, 47 App. D.C. 406, 409 WL 18180 (1918).
65. *Give Vote to Women Is Advice by Wilson*, Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1918, at 1; 56 Cong. Rec. 762–810 (1918); *House for Suffrage*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1918, at 1; *Woman Suffrage Wins in House by One Vote*, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1918, at 1.
66. Dodd, 416–24.
67. Cott, 66 (quoting a letter from Harriot Stanton Blatch to Anne Martin, May 14, 1918).
68. See, e.g., Amy E. Butler, *Two Paths to Equality: Alice Paul and Ethel M. Smith in the ERA Debate, 1921–1929* (2002); Cott, 117–42; Alice Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States 181–214* (1982).
69. On the 1921 Convention, see Cott, 67–73; Eastman, 57, 61; Freda Kirchwey, *Alice Paul Pulls the Strings*, *The Nation*, Mar. 2, 1921, at 332–33.
70. Cott, 72 (quoting a letter from Mabel Putnam to Anita L. Pollitzer, Apr. 14, 1921).
71. Eastman, 62. On the work of the NWP in the 1920s and 1930s, when Paul retained her influence even after giving up her official position, see, e.g., Susan D. Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism between the Wars* (1981); Gretchen Ritter, *The Constitution as Social Design: Gender and Civic Membership in the American Constitutional Order* (2006); Cott, ch. 4; Nancy F. Cott, *Feminist Politics in the 1920s: The National Woman's Party*, 71 *J. Am. Hist.* 43 (1984).

72. On the work of the NWP from World War II to the 1960s, see Cynthia Harrison, *On Account of Sex: The Politics of Women's Issues, 1945–1968* (1989); Leila J. Rupp & Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Woman's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s* (1987).

73. Cott, 67 (quoting a letter from Doris Stevens to Betty Gram Swing, Jan. 8, 1946).

74. *Alice Paul, a Leader for Suffrage and Women's Rights, Dies at 92*, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1977.